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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States Government. sputtered into military service in the early 20 th century. Leadership found it challenging to embrace the evolution of combined arms warfare while an over-zealous drive by aviation proponents within the Army created a rift, but the Army continued to struggle for over a half century to define the role of aviation within its ranks, particularly that of attack aviation. Interservice rivalry with the Air Force in its infancy coupled with its overly strategic focus on the role of airpower in warfare failed to meet the needs of maneuver commanders on the ground.
Fortunately for Army aviators and ground commanders alike, a few key leaders saw potential where the Air Force saw competition, and they were able to bend the rules between the services and the bureaucracy enough to give the concept of armed helicopter technology and doctrine room to develop and take hold.
The US Army adopted attack helicopter operations in response to an overwhelming requirement for integrated close air support (CAS) in a direct support relationship to the ground commander within the service. "The tangles over equipment and roles from World War II through the 1950s substantially influenced the armed forces as to what command and control systems were needed." 1 Those tangles were defined by the Army insisting on greater CAS capabilities, while the Air Force insisted upon its strategic and independent role on a grand scale that negated anything that might be construed as a subordinate relationship to the Army and its mission. The evolution of Army Aviation following the creation of the Air Force in 1947 was a mixture of political and military influences that resulted in years of indecision and turf wars in
Washington that frequently overlooked the needs of the commander on the ground.
The 1950s were critical to the modern identity of attack aviation within the Army and US airpower capabilities as a whole. A clear understanding of why its role was so contested in bureaucracy instead of reacting to the operational needs of the force is essential to appreciating the magnitude of these changes. The challenges facing the development of Army attack aviation can be understood from three distinct lenses: the Air Force's drive for institutional independence and legitimacy, the overemphasis of the services and the political leadership on strategic airpower, and the inability to accept newly defined roles to foster joint capabilities.
From an airpower perspective among the service leadership, it is important not to get entrenched in the technology aspect to define the political influence in the situation. "One must not collapse what airpower is with what it is about. Each element in the familiar statement of the strategic function is essential: ends, ways, and means." 2 The resistance to attack aviation development within the Army was not a turf war over who received which type of equipment;
rather it was a contest of roles and responsibilities at a strategic level between the services. The problem was one of cultural rhetoric that drove the Air Force to continue to try and legitimize its independence and focus less on its requirements to support the Army mission. Shrinking budgets and service sizes forced a reexamination of roles where "matters of power, money, jobs, 6 Initially, airplanes would carry an artilleryman observer to adjust fires in flight of ground artillery. Eventually as missions became more complex, it was determined that having two trained pilots was more advantageous, though both had to be trained artillerymen for the purposes of mission planning and effective employment. 7 Even though the Army Air Forces remained a part of the Army, the ground commanders still needed to further subdivide the assets for assignment to support ground units directly.
Already the Army Air Forces had begun their drive for independence and legitimacy, so the Army had no choice but to take ownership of its own requirements in order to accomplish its mission. This divide would continue to drive rivalries within aviation arguably indefinitely, well beyond the establishment of the independent Air Force. Numerous challenges plagued this division of Army aviation through WWII and beyond. Training was not centralized, units were not standardized, and the assets available were extremely vulnerable to pursuit aircraft, so much so that the use of observation aircraft in WWII was deemed tactically infeasible and most of their role was replaced by more advanced fighters reconfigured for reconnaissance, and not in direct support to the ground force. 12 This complete disregard for the Army's need to employ tactical airpower resulted in the Army more forcefully acquiring its own forms of internal air support.
The result of these challenges led to continuous rivalry through the war in which the Army looked to the Marine Corps' command and control concept in which their integrated air assets were dedicated directly to the ground force. 13 When compared with their own experience with the Air Force, the Army began to more aggressively seek solutions to tactical airpower problems.
General Matthew Ridgeway reinforced this idea in his autobiography stating that if the Air Force did not adequately provide the Army with CAS capabilities, the Army "eventually will have to develop them ourselves." 14 The solution to this dilemma would ultimately come in the form of the helicopter, though such technology did not yet exist in a competitive form. Early proponents of observation and reconnaissance aviation suggested the use of autogiros for their short field take off and maneuverability characteristics. The autogiro flew at slow speeds for detailed observation and could be easily forward deployed to unimproved landing sites. Unfortunately, they did not develop an effective model, and through WWII they were too vulnerable for tactical application so the idea was lost. 15 The first combat application of a helicopter came in the form of the YR-4B helicopter in a rescue mission of a downed British pilot in Burma on 21 April 1944. 16 The demonstration of flexibility and response by the "flying egg-beater" was nearly as inspirational to forward thinking military theorists as the Wright flyer's first take-off. In 1954, then Major
General James Gavin became one of the early proponents of adapting helicopters into the Army doctrine, specifically the cavalry to address Army shortfalls in Korea. He had seen the utility of aircraft and gliders as an airborne commander during WWII to deliver soldiers behind enemy lines, and with the birth of rotary wing capabilities he sought to redefine the way that the Army looked at aviation combined arms. "Where was the cavalry? And I don't mean horses. I mean helicopters and light aircraft." 17 He took this point further to highlight the maneuver capabilities of helicopters in the true cavalry spirit that could provide early warning, flexible firepower, and a rapid capability to reinforce flanks of the ground force. 18 Gavin met pervasive opposition to his
ideas, however, and ended up retiring after his time as the Army G-3, but his ideas were not lost on then Brigadier General Hamilton Howze, whom Gavin nominated to be the first director of Army aviation in the G-3. 19 Howze's role in the development of attack aviation would come much later.
Further up the chain of command, General Matthew Ridgeway and his successor General
Maxwell Taylor developed the concept of "flexible response" in light of nuclear warfare. 20 A nuclear battlefield would require the Army to deploy and maneuver rapidly over great distances, and Taylor spearheaded a "sky cavalry" concept that would maneuver infantry units rapidly across the battlefield to conduct reconnaissance and quick-reaction operations until reinforcements could arrive, notwithstanding the potential requirement to make a retrograde movement out of fallout zones more quickly. It was at this time that murmurings began to surface about the importance of organic firepower to such units, as well as the ability to develop light aircraft that could destroy tanks. 21 from .50 caliber machine guns to Swiss-made Oerlikon anti-tank rockets. 30 At first glance the idea of arming an observation helicopter with a simple machine gun or two might seem defensive in nature, but the introduction of anti-tank rockets and maneuver doctrine specifically tailored toward "air fighting" helicopters was a significant transition in turning a mobility and observation platform in to an offensive weapons system.
The rag-tag group of mechanics and pilots proceeded through an exhaustive yet unscientific barrage of testing all of the weapons in multiple configurations and flight profiles, stopping in between to check for damage to the aircraft. Having no historical data or simulation capabilities, they began with single aircraft and were surprised by the results and accuracy they were able to achieve with the new weapons platform. 31 They experimented with new tactical formation flying, utilizing low altitudes and terrain analysis to facilitate surprise and concealment just like any other form of tactical maneuver and ultimately striking targets. "It was all condoned and encouraged at lower levels of command and generally ignored at higher levels." 32 Eventually they would evolve the testing to include multiple variants of fin-stabilized rockets on H-25s, UH-19s, and CH-21s. From 1956-1959 they sought any and all forms of weapons systems the world over that they could hang from helicopters with the main objective of being able to strike hardened targets and vehicles. The Air Force even provided a B-29 gun turret to be mounted under the forward fuselage of a CH-21, though it is very likely that the upper levels of command were unaware of what was being done with that equipment. 33 Therein lies another example of the disconnect between senior leaders and those closest to the fight. The
Army was soliciting parts and equipment from all of the services who happily assisted to develop its new weapons system. While dangerous to allow unchecked procurement and development initiatives without senior command oversight, the important lesson is to understand the requirement at the lowest level, and make the highest levels understand.
Despite all of this development at Fort Rucker and elsewhere, Washington level leadership was still openly against the idea. General Taylor visited Hutton to tell him to cease the arming of helicopters, yet Hutton continued the program. 34 Even more explicitly, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson issued a memorandum for the Armed Forces Policy Council that prohibited Army aviation from conducting "Tactical reconnaissance, Interdiction of the battlefield, and close combat air support," and even directed that they "will not maintain unilateral aviation research facilities." 35 The Secretary of Defense expressly prohibited the exact activities that were being conducted at Fort Rucker, and yet they continued for years thereafter.
Fortunately for the Army aircrews and ground maneuver units, the pioneers at Fort Rucker were willing to continue their trials as the advancements and lessons learned directly contributed to the success of the Airmobile Division concept soon to be unveiled.
marked another small step forward into attack aviation legitimacy when Hamilton
Howze attended the Army Aircraft Requirements Board and attempted to redefine the Army's ability to arm helicopters. The end result was not an explicit approval; however he was able to insert one authorization into the summary, "The Requirement General Gavin.
The ultimate recommendation was that the Army should create division-sized air-mobile units that contained a mix of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft that could maneuver itself unassisted through the battlefield. 40 Within this capability, the board recommended the inclusion of AO-1
Mohawk fixed-wing aircraft as a CAS platform as well as armed UH-1B gunships (until a dedicated attack aircraft could be developed) organic to the division. 41 The Navy developed the AO-1 aircraft originally as a reconnaissance platform for the Marine Corps, but when it was plagued with production complications and proved incapable of carrier landings, the Army procured the project. Hard-points on the wings allowed for the installation of rockets and other ordnance and the Howze board utilized it as a CAS platform during the field tests. While the total concept recommended was not put into place, the positive result of the board's work was the approval to field the 11 th Air Assault Division (Test). 42 The Air Force responded to the Howze Board with a panel of its own headed by General Gabriel Disosway to cross-examine the recommendations put forth by the Army. While largely critical of the Army's foray into organic CAS platforms, they did recognize the need to expand the capabilities of Tactical Air Command's role in providing fixed wing CAS to the Army. 43 This outcome was largely seen as a win for the Army, but ultimately the results of the Howze board were not as positive as they had hoped at its outset. The members of the panel created over 600 pages of recommendations on how the Army should reorganize its mobility concepts, but despite Secretary McNamara's noble intentions, the majority of the recommendation was ultimately ignored for other competing requirements. 44 In March of 1963 the Army reignited the Howze board recommendations and issued a requirement for a dedicated attack helicopter design, but continued political jockeying over roles and responsibilities for airpower by the Air Force delayed the contract bidding by another two years. 45 Still envisioning the air-fighting aircraft through the lens of artillery, the board recommended the procurement of the Advanced Aerial Fire Support System (AAFSS) and awarded it to Lockheed for the development of the AH-56A. 46 Due to the friction with the Air Force, however, the contract did not get awarded until 1966; a year after the 1 st Air Cavalry Division entered combat. Furthermore, technical issues with the aircraft rendered it unfit for mass production and the Army cancelled the AH-56A program after the war. and the ability to cover large portions of the battlefield." 47 It was only fitting that the cavalry be reborn with the helicopter, and as a result the division re-flagged to become 1 st Air Cavalry Division. 48 In preparation for the deployment, Fort Rucker established its UH-1 transition program to graduate 120 pilots from the aerial weapons firing course. 49 The Army's first attack pilots were heading to combat.
As with all wars, tactics, techniques, and procedures had to be developed to reinforce or improve upon the training that laid the foundation for readiness. New technology never before used in combat in roles designed by theorists on staff somewhere requires rapid innovation and trial and error when faced with the intangible threats of a new enemy and style of combat. The pioneers at Fort Rucker took a simplistic approach to training the new technology. Colonel
Vanderpool studied the organization of the Duke of Wellington's cavalry to create his own organizational concept, and just re-wrote the most recent horse cavalry manual written in 1936 to include helicopters instead. His original vision still relied heavily on combined arms maneuver including mutually supporting infantry, artillery, and cavalry, with the primary mission of the helicopters being the delivery of troops for rapid maneuver. That said, he also envisioned aerial artillery capability that allowed helicopters to deliver ordnance from the air that could be even more rapidly displaced firepower than towed artillery pieces or even those slung from helicopters. 50 Within the context of developing attack aviation strategy on a grander scheme, the translation of these tactics, techniques, and procedures back into the political realm is critical.
"[M]ilitary threat and behavior (latent or explicit) serve the politics that make policy." 51 If the behavior is not observed or understood by the senior leadership, the policy will not serve those entrusted with its ultimate execution.
During initial combat operations, attack aviation followed the doctrine and training that existed at the time. Armed helicopters were a mobile extension of artillery, best suited for preparatory fires. 1 st CAV combined 105mm howitzer barrages followed by aerial rocket artillery from UH-1s and then strafing runs by gunships to prepare landing zones in the air assault process. 52 Drawing on the doctrine initiated at Fort Rucker, the armed helicopter still occupied a role more as mobile artillery or a tank-like platform that could maneuver beyond the limits of the ground forces. Multiple variations on armed helicopters already existed within the inventory, but they were all primarily troop carrying aircraft that were modified; none of them had been designed solely as a weapons platform. The artillery mind set and mission of the ARA still kept the battalion assigned to the fires brigade in a support role, rather than in an offensive manner.
2/20 th had many noteworthy combat successes throughout its tour in Vietnam that would later contribute to the attack aviation concept as a whole. First, they demonstrated the rapid response time to troops-in-contact that would be the primary selling point for furthering the Army aviation cause. Whether airborne or forward-staged, the crews could respond to calls for fire within minutes, and they were easily integrated into the order of battle for preparatory fires and artillery adjustment. Second, they demonstrated the ability to perform armed reconnaissance independently, identifying enemy forces, attacking with organic weapons, and then reinforcing with the insertion of infantry. They were most effective when launched immediately following attacks on forward bases and identifying small teams retrograding into the jungle, but this was the early form of armed reconnaissance and close-combat attack that would take flight in tactics throughout the war and into the future. 55 Finally they demonstrated the adaptability of attack aviation to rise to the operational needs of the maneuver commander in a rapid manner both in tactics and in firepower. 2/20 th was the first unit to fire wire-guided SS-11 anti-tank weapons at point targets in combat, and they were also the first to combine the precision missiles with the area suppression capability of 2.75 inch rockets on the same platform. 56 These important firsts were critical to the future of attack aviation and its development as a maneuver fighting force of organic firepower within the Army.
The Huey gunships were capable of carrying a vast array of weapons systems that included more than a dozen variations on rockets, missiles, grenade launchers machine guns and mini-guns. 57 There still seemed to be little if any systematic approach to the armed helicopter Another such example of the unique innovation without the assistance of Washington was the "Guns a Go-Go" concept of an armed Chinook. Boeing independently built four prototypes in response to the AAFSS requirement and they delivered them to theater by the end of 1965. 59 Despite their massive payload and speed, they proved overly vulnerable due to their size and the concept never stuck. Hueys were continuing to provide vital and flexible support, but the need for a dedicated attack platform became more pressing as the reliance on gunships increased. Industry was independently responding to the needs of the force, yet the senior leadership was unable to come to a consensus to unify the efforts further and develop a coherent vision and direction for the armed helicopter concept.
Bell Helicopter also conducted independent development of an attack helicopter of its own that drew on the already proven reliabilities of the UH-1 series also in response to the AAFSS initiative. The HueyCobra (later shortened to just Cobra) resulted, and flew for the first time in 1965. 60 The Cobra provided an interim solution, but that temporary solution continued to provide effective service for over 30 years in the Army, and even longer in the Marine Corps.
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"On a typical mission the AH-1G could reach the target area in about half the time taken by the UH-1 gunships, and could deploy twice their firepower while remaining on station for almost three times as long." 62 It also had a much smaller frontal cross-section and was more maneuverable, making it slightly more survivable. From 1967 through the end of the war, the AH-1G replaced the UH-1B/Cs as the primary gunship, though some Huey gunships remained in service through the end of the war for specific armament missions and were often teamed with
Cobras for more effective support and firepower. 63 Gunship tactics were the next innovation that turned the corner for Army attack aviation.
Armed helicopters served in virtually every aviation unit in Vietnam, each with a blend of AH, simple gunship units. 64 The four missions gunships executed were escort, troop support, armed reconnaissance, and direct fire support. Initially the armed aircraft served as an escort for the air mobility concept and the gunships would routinely provide preparatory fires on landing zones prior to transport arrival, and then transition to a ground support role as troops deployed and more transports came in. Combat imperatives within the Vietnam War allowed nearly unchecked expansions within Army aviation to swell massively, so much so that by 1970 the Army had more than 12,000 aircraft and 24,000 aviators, both statistics far outmatching the number of machines and pilots in the Air Force. 67 At the conclusion of the war, however, the two services struggled to define the place where attack helicopters should reside on the modern battlefield. What the Army was certain of, was that aviation played a critical role in nearly every aspect of ground maneuver warfare: command and control, logistics, reconnaissance, maneuver, and firepower. Finally reaching middle ground, the two chiefs paved the way for the future of Army attack aviation. The memorandum further defined the Air Force CAS role as a "centrally controlled," and "theater-wide" asset designed to supplement the Army's organic firepower where required. 76 After thirty years of arguing over roles and responsibilities, the two services finally came to agreement on the critical role of attack aviation in the hands of the Army, and that such capabilities were in no way a duplication of the Air Force responsibilities. Instead, they proved to be an enabling asset that would ultimately provide the Air Force greater flexibility to accomplish its strategic role. Fortunately the combat trials of Vietnam were a salient example of the utility of armed helicopters and the leadership finally identified their successes for the future of Army aviation.
The Army overplayed its hand in the first attempt at an attack helicopter. They had proven successes with simple, stable, and relatively inexpensive vehicles jerry rigged with any form of armament that could be mounted to them. The AH-56A Cheyenne concept morphed into a Star Wars-esque advancement of technology well before its time. It was meant to be bullet resistant, laser capable, faster than any other helicopter ever built, all weather, and electronic warfare equipped. 77 After killing one of its test pilots due to instabilities, the AH-56A program ended, but "bureaucratically entrenched Army aviation was here to stay, but not as an ersatz United States Air Force." 78 In 1973 the Army initiated a new program after the demise of the AH-56A, the Advanced Attack Helicopter. Bell took an approach that improved upon the already proven AH-1 designs and the Army designated it as the YAH-63. 79 Hughes Tool Company designed the YAH-64.
One of the competition requirements was for the aircraft to withstand a .50 caliber impact to the main rotor mast and still fly. This requirement ultimately resulted in massive helicopter size and redundant system complexity. 80 Many critics emerged against the future Apache due to its complexity and argued that it would not be sustainable in an austere environment on the front The Apache's Forward Looking Infrared and night flying capabilities were ideally suited to identify maneuvering armor and mechanized forces at night, the only limitation was the amount of fuel they could carry. 83 The Deep Attack mission was born and attack aviation had come into its own as a major player in combined arms doctrine as well as the joint arena. 
